Deconstructing adaptive management: Criteria for applications to environmental management by Gregory, R et al.
Ecological Applications, 16(6), 2006, pp. 2411–2425
 2006 by the Ecological Society of America
DECONSTRUCTING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: CRITERIA FOR
APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
R. GREGORY,1,4 D. OHLSON,2 AND J. ARVAI1,3
1Decision Research, 1160 Devina Drive, Galiano, British Columbia V0N 1P0 Canada
2Compass Resource Management, Suite 200, 1260 Hamilton Street, Vancouver, British Columbia V6B 2S8 Canada
3Department of CARRS, 305 Natural Resources Building, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 USA
Abstract. The concept of adaptive management has, for many ecologists, become a
foundation of effective environmental management for initiatives characterized by high levels
of ecological uncertainty. Yet problems associated with its application are legendary, and
many of the initiatives promoted as examples of adaptive management appear to lack essential
characteristics of the approach. In this paper we propose explicit criteria for helping managers
and decision makers to determine the appropriateness of either passive or active adaptive-
management strategies as a response to ecological uncertainty in environmental management.
Four categories of criteria—dealing with spatial and temporal scale, dimensions of
uncertainty, the evaluation of costs and beneﬁts, and institutional and stakeholder support—
are deﬁned and applied using hypothetical yet realistic case-study scenarios that illustrate a
range of environmental management problems. We conclude that many of the issues facing
adaptive management may have less to do with the approach itself than with the
indiscriminate choice of contexts within which it is now applied.
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INTRODUCTION
Few concepts in environmental management are both
as widely promoted and as widely misunderstood as
adaptive management (AM). Since its inception more
than two decades ago (Holling 1978, Walters 1986), AM
has been elevated to a position at the forefront of
ecological science and environmental management for
dealing with problems characterized by high levels of
uncertainty (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Yet its track
record of implementation is weak (Walters 1997) and
many ecological planning, restoration, and recovery
initiatives that are promoted under the banner of
adaptive management exhibit few, if any, of the
characteristics generally considered to be essential. As
a result, an overview of the applications literature tells a
conﬂicting story; one could conclude that adaptive
management should either be relied upon heavily or
criticized sharply when considering solutions to chal-
lenging resource management problems.
Much of the conﬂict can be traced to the appealing
nature of AM as a theoretical construct. The central
premise of learning by doing is so attractive and
universally intuitive that one is hard pressed to ﬁnd an
environmental resource management plan or statement
of environmental policy that does not make at least
some form of commitment to the use of AM. The
problem is that ‘‘learning by doing’’ is often invoked as a
management objective without a clear deﬁnition of what
it means (i.e., What constitutes learning and how much
of it is required?) or how to properly do it (i.e., How to
implement AM?). As a result, AM as applied in many
management contexts retains little meaning.
Another source of conﬂict stems from the urgent need
for tools to help environmental management profes-
sionals make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
The pairing of signiﬁcant uncertainty about the behavior
and response of ecological systems with urgent calls for
near-term action constitutes a difﬁcult reality, and a
common lament, for many resource managers. Few are
well versed in the science of decision making under
uncertainty, so the apparent availability of a method
ostensibly designed for just this purpose is understand-
ably appealing.
But there is a dark side to this attraction, for two
different groups of environmental-management profes-
sionals and for very different reasons. A ﬁrst group,
composed mainly of upper-level managers and bureau-
crats who work in environmental-management agencies,
is attracted to AM because they seek an accepted
approach that can allow for postponement of the
difﬁcult decisions that need to be made (often later,
and by someone else) in the face of resource constraints
and scientiﬁc uncertainty. The second group, composed
of biological scientists, is attracted to AM because it
provides a tenable mechanism for applying the scientiﬁc
method to challenging problems facing complex ecosys-
tems, often resulting in the design of costly experiments
that tend to ignore impacts on other important
environmental, social, or economic objectives.
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In this paper we attempt to help untangle some of
these conﬂicts by providing guidance on when AM
approaches should be used and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, when they should not. In doing so, we present
criteria for the selection and design of AM initiatives
and evaluate them in the context of several speciﬁc
environmental-management options drawn from illus-
trative—hypothetical yet realistic—case-study scenarios
in forestry and ﬁsheries management as well as land-use
planning.
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
AM is designed primarily to help managers learn
about complex ecological systems by monitoring the
results of a suite of management initiatives. In this sense,
it is a systematic approach to improving the manage-
ment process and accommodating change by learning
from the outcomes of a set of environmental manage-
ment policies and practices (Holling 1978, Walters
1986). The generally stated goal of AM is to improve
managers’ knowledge about a set of well-deﬁned
ecological objectives through the implementation of
carefully designed, quasi-experimental management
interventions and monitoring programs. At least in
theory, the increased knowledge should also assist
resource managers in responding to the inevitable
ecological surprises that arise over the course of a
management intervention (Clark 1980). However, as the
later text will discuss in more detail, economic and social
and political surprises also can arise over the course of a
management intervention, thus creating problems for an
ecologically focused adaptive management plan.
Both the theory and the practice of adaptive
management have expanded greatly over the past
quarter century. AM ﬁrst emerged from a desire to
address practical problems of environmental and natural
resources management. The early efforts of Holling,
Walters, and their colleagues made progress toward the
goal of improved ecosystem understanding through
development of theory and quantitative techniques
supporting adaptive management. Later efforts by a
variety of researchers, summarized in collections edited
by Gunderson et al. (1995) and Gunderson and Holling
(2002), provided both a useful perspective on ecological
science and guidance toward developing improved
institutional support for adaptive management.
Two primary types of adaptive management have
been deﬁned, ‘‘passive’’ and ‘‘active’’, which vary in their
degree of scientiﬁc rigor and experimental design
(Walters and Holling 1990, Halbert 1993). Both
approaches are valuable and (as discussed in more
detail in the next sections) either may be considered
more or less appropriate depending on the circumstanc-
es of a given management problem.
In passive adaptive management, managers typically
use historical data, from the speciﬁc area under
consideration or from areas considered to be ecologi-
cally comparable, to develop a ‘‘best guess’’ hypothesis
and to implement a preferred course of action.
Outcomes are monitored and new information is used
to update the historical data set and, if necessary, the
hypotheses and management action. This makes good
sense when there is high conﬁdence in the anticipated
ecosystem response (i.e., the basic structural models are
well deﬁned) and managers can focus on reﬁning
parameter estimates. Passive adaptive management also
makes good sense when the regulatory or institutional
constraints are strong, so that the range of possible
variations (e.g., in water ﬂows) is small. In practice,
unfortunately, passive adaptive management often turns
into basic trial and error learning in which explicit
hypotheses are absent or vague, the updating of
historical data is haphazard, monitoring is incomplete,
and only incremental changes are made to monitoring
plans. Although learning may occur, the pace is
relatively slow and typically without clear implications
for management practices. There is also a very real
potential for error, because complex interactions and
cumulative effects may confound results and analyses.
In the worst case, there may be a complete lack of data
updating along with no essential changes to manage-
ment actions (Folke et al. 2004).
Under active adaptive management, in comparison,
managers typically seek to deﬁne competing hypotheses
about the impact of management activities on ecosystem
functions and, in turn, design management experiments
to test them. In this way, systems are deliberately tested
through management interventions, often with several
alternative types of management activities attempted in
sequence or in parallel so as to observe and compare
results. Thus, the scope of an active AM initiative, as
conventionally interpreted, can vary from that of a
broad, organizing framework for management of a
natural environment to a more limited scope that
addresses a speciﬁc management problem or even one
aspect of a problem (Gregory et al. 2006). Either way,
the attraction of an active (as opposed to passive) AM
approach is that it will, in theory, deliver more
statistically testable information in a shorter period of
time. However, active approaches are only as good as
their experimental design and they require more (often
substantially more) resources to plan, implement, and
monitor; these higher costs can exceed the capacity of
some management agencies (see Gregory et al. 2005). In
some cases, active approaches also may involve greater
risks to sensitive species or other values, along with a
greater willingness and capacity on the part of managers
to act on new information.
Both passive and active AM have been applied to
ecosystem management problems with varying spatial
scales, ecosystem types, ownership patterns, socio-
economic characteristics, risk implications, and political,
regulatory, and jurisdictional complexity. This diversity
is both an indication of the enthusiasm with which the
concept has been greeted and a source of difﬁculty in
that AM, by design, cannot be a ‘‘one size ﬁts all’’
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solution to complex problems in environmental man-
agement that exhibit ecological uncertainty.
Some applications of AM have been relatively simple
and small scale. The British Columbia Forest Service,
for example, conducted experiments throughout the
1990s to evaluate alternative forest-harvesting tech-
niques (Taylor et al. 1997). These studies had limited
physical impacts beyond the speciﬁc treatment location
(i.e., they posed no threat to the viability of the overall
ecosystem or any individual species) and results were
rarely applied to other sites. In contrast, the application
of AM approaches to the Florida Everglades (Walters et
al. 1992) or the Columbia River Basin (Lee 1992) has
been far more complex. In the latter instance, the AM
experiments affected multiple interests (farmers, indus-
try, ﬁshers, First Nations/Native Americans), seriously
interfered with some local economic activities, required
cooperation from multiple regulatory agencies, and had
the potential to gravely threaten endangered salmon
stocks. In this multi-faceted environment, many of the
potential beneﬁts of an AM approach were never
realized and, according to at least some participants,
many of the critical questions that faced the Northwest
Power Planning Council in 1984 when it adopted the
AM concept were left unresolved (Lee 1993).
These are legitimate examples of AM. Other cases
share little more than the same name. Walters (1997)
noted that of 25 major planning exercises for adaptive
management that he has participated in, only seven
resulted in experiments of an appropriate scale, and only
two could be considered well planned in terms of
statistical design. Other initiatives, according to Walters
(1997:3), have either ‘‘vanished with no visible product’’
or become ‘‘trapped in an apparently endless process of
model development and reﬁnement.’’
There have been lengthy discussions about why AM
has not been more widely adopted and, when it has, why
some applications of AM have proven to be more
successful than others. In response to both questions,
some authors have suggested that AM is most feasible
and most likely to be successful when the application
context is small and relatively simple, so that only few
regulatory bodies are involved, the number of interest
groups is small and the impacts on them are not severe,
and the risk to any species is low (McConnaha and
Paquet 1996). These comments are helpful but ignore
the fact that (as in the Columbia River example) some of
the management contexts where help to deal with
scientiﬁc uncertainty is most needed are undeniably
large and complex and messy. Other observers (e.g., Lee
1993, Gregory and Failing 2002) have linked the limited
implementation success of AM to some of the strong
emotional responses that arise among participants
during planning and implementation. Scientists, for
example, can become frustrated by the lack of support
from policy makers and managers who are impatient
with the long time periods that may be required for
acquiring statistically valid ﬁeld trial results. Conversely,
administrators can become frustrated by scientists who
appear to be insensitive to the risks posed by experi-
mentation and seem to believe that the pursuit of
scientiﬁc knowledge is a justiﬁed end in itself. Mean-
while the public, seeking near-term results and an
assurance of success, is often put off by the dual
concepts of uncertainty and experimentation, particu-
larly if some of the less successful trials (i.e., those that
could ‘‘fail’’) might occur in their own backyard.
Many other reasons have been cited among the
difﬁculties in implementation of AM plans; as in the
examples noted above, these reasons stem from a variety
of issues related to the often-conﬂicting priorities of
decision makers and scientists, overlapping jurisdictions,
stakeholder fears, and ecosystem considerations. (Hal-
bert 1993, McLain and Lee 1996, Walters 1997, Rogers
1998). These reasons include:
 a failure of scientists to understand the broader array
of management priorities and to recognize the need to
provide information that can be directly used by
decision makers;
 the failure by overlapping management agencies to
fully and clearly deﬁne their responsibilities for
implementing an AM plan;
 a lack of emphasis or attention to the processes
required for building shared understanding and shared
decision making among diverse stakeholders; and
 the tendency among many scientists to overstate their
capability to measure complex functional relationships
through experimentation.
There is no single response to these diverse concerns.
Anecdotal evidence can be found for patiently working
within the system, helping to educate and establish an
improved dialogue among managers and scientists and
the public over time; other evidence points to the
beneﬁts of a more ‘‘go-it-alone’’ strategy, particularly
among scientists who are frustrated by not being
allowed to pursue favored management or treatment
options. Some proponents of AM have sought help in
improved evaluation techniques, noting in particular the
advantages associated with integrating formal decision-
analysis techniques into adaptive management. For
example, Peterman and Peters (1998) describe how
decision analysis is particularly effective during the
planning stage of an active adaptive-management
proposal because it can help to compare the expected
performance of alternative experimental designs. Other
authors demonstrate the use of decision-analysis tech-
niques to calculate the present value of alternative AM
strategies (Walters and Green 1997) or show how
decision analysis can be used to compare the potential
economic performance of experimental and nonexperi-
mental strategies (Sainsbury 1991). And most recently,
Failing et al. (2004) demonstrate the integrated use of
probabilistic expert judgments and structured multi-
stakeholder decision methods to select and evaluate a
preferred AM design.
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We acknowledge the need for ﬂexibility and agree that
the more widespread application of decision-analysis
techniques—and, more generally, adherence to the
underlying principles and methods of sound decision
making—will aid in the design and conduct of AM
initiatives. However, we see the biggest obstacle to the
more widespread, and successful, application of AM
techniques as something different and, for better or
worse, largely within the control of proponents of AM
approaches. This obstacle has little to do with improved
education for—or communication among—the partici-
pants in an AM process or better methods of evaluation.
Instead, it exists mainly in the context of how the
problems to which AM might be applied are identiﬁed
and deﬁned. What is needed, in addition to better
communication and education and improved evaluation
methods, is a set of conceptually sound yet practical
criteria to help decision makers make thoughtful choices
when it comes to the selection of problems that either
are, or are not, appropriate for the application of AM
techniques. Simply put, the problems facing AM may
have less to do with the approach itself than with the
indiscriminate choice of contexts within which it is
applied.
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF AM
When considering an environmental management
problem, we believe there are four topic areas that
should be used to establish sensible criteria regarding its
appropriateness for the application of AM techniques.
These include (1) the spatial and temporal scale of the
problem, (2) the relevant dimensions of uncertainty, (3)
the associated suite of costs, beneﬁts, and risks, and (4)
the degree to which there is stakeholder and institutional
support. Each of these criteria can be cast as questions
to be posed by resource managers contemplating the use
of an AM approach (see Table 1). These questions, and
the responses they naturally imply, are intended to form
a more defensible basis on which resource managers can
systematically probe the pros and cons of various
options for the selection and implementation of AM
approaches.
In order to illustrate use of these criteria, the ensuing
discussion employs four hypothetical but realistic case-
study scenarios that exhibit a range in complexity. They
are realistic in the sense that they are grounded in actual
examples for which resource managers and land-use
planners have either considered or implemented an AM
TABLE 1. Summary of proposed criteria for deciding whether to use adaptive management (AM), by topic area and formulated as
questions.
Topic-area consideration Criteria questions
Spatial and temporal scale
Duration Is the project timeline to obtain verified results compatible with management
decision-making requirements?
Spatial extent and complexity If spatial extent or complexity is large, are there opportunities to apply AM on a
subset of the problem and scale up?
External effects Have potential issues related to background trends and cumulative effects of
management actions been addressed in the AM design?
Dimensions of uncertainty
Parameter uncertainty Has the AM design been pared down to focus on only those uncertainties most
likely to influence management decisions?
Structural uncertainty Are there profound structural uncertainties? If so, how will surprise outcomes be
managed?
Stochastic uncertainty How do low-probability random natural and other causal events affect the AM
design and expected outcomes?
Confidence in assessments If the confidence in the proposed AM design is low, can expert judgment or other
techniques help?
Costs, benefits, and risks
Specifying benefits and costs Can all the costs and benefits (and risks) be documented and communicated in a
manner understandable to all stakeholders?
Magnitude of effects Will the information collected through AM have sufficient predictive ability to
make a difference to managers?
Multiple objectives Does the design and assessment of AM plans explicitly address the multiple goals of
stakeholders (rather than only scientists)?
Perceived risks of failure Can stopping rules and clear thresholds identify and/or minimize the perceived risks
of failures, to species and to institutions?
Stakeholder and institutional support
Leadership Is there explicit policy guidance and leadership support for AM? Will stakeholders see
AM as an effective way to deal with uncertainty?
Flexibility in decision making Is there sufficient management flexibility (and continuity) to incorporate new
information in revised experimental designs?
Avoidance of taboo trade-offs Does the proposed AM design involve any trade-offs that might be considered taboo
by some stakeholders?
Institutional capacity Are sufficient analytical skills available (staff or contractors) to design, evaluate, and
monitor AM plans?
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approach. As summarized in Table 2, these four cases
include (at lower levels of complexity) a tree-fertilization
application and a ﬁsheries-restoration example and (as
complexity increases) an assessment of wildﬁre fuels
management and a regional land-use planning example.
Spatial and temporal scale
Most environmental management problems cover
multiple geographic and temporal scales. Understanding
the spatial and temporal dimensions of the decision
context is an important starting point for probing
opportunities to successfully apply AM. The basic
question is whether it is reasonable to design experi-
mental management regimes that might cover large
geographic areas or extend many years—in some cases,
decades—into the future.
Duration.—AMmust account for the response time of
parameters chosen as suitable end points for the
resource-management problem. Support for AM initia-
tives is likely to be lower in cases where results of the
proposed manipulation will take a longer time to
become known. Holding other things constant, waiting
a longer time for results means higher costs and a greater
opportunity for contamination of the study design due
to the inﬂuence of external factors. With respect to costs,
evaluation schemes comparing alternative AM design
options generally involve calculating the discounted sum
of the expected annual net beneﬁts (i.e., beneﬁts minus
costs), with annual values deﬁned in terms of expected
results based on probability-weighted hypotheses (Wal-
ters and Green 1997). Given the typical practice of using
a positive discount rate (most often in the range 3%–6%)
to estimate present-day equivalents, the value assigned
to beneﬁts or costs occurring in the near future (i.e., in
1–5 years) is substantially greater that those occurring in
the medium-term of far future (i.e., more than two or
three decades hence).
To some extent the duration of a management
strategy is a function of the problem context. In our
simplest case, monitoring the growth response of
seedlings to fertilization (Problem 1 in Table 2), the
response time would be short (two or three years) and
unproblematic from an experimental design point of
view. On the other hand, monitoring the accumulation
of forest fuels across alternative treatment regimes, as
required in the wildﬁre fuels management case (Problem
3), might require decades. And taking into account the
lag-time response of key landscape-level indicators of
biodiversity to climate change (Problem 4), such as
might be required to validate the selection of a protected
area boundary within a land-use plan, suggests that very
long timelines (several decades or more) would be
required.
The duration of an AM plan is also a function of the
selected design, and here AM proponents often have
failed to do a careful job stating and/or analyzing their
case (see Hilborn and Walters 1992). Consider Problem
2, which could involve changes in water ﬂows to
encourage higher salmonid populations. An active AM
approach (assuming baseline data of reasonable quality)
might see three or four different ﬂow levels, each held
for up to four years, for a total duration of 12–16 years.
Replication of these results would double this timeline.
These are long time periods for any results-oriented
management agency. One option is to consider setting
the experiments up using a titration or step-down
strategy, where rules are developed to help decide
whether the results of the ﬁrst or second trials are
TABLE 2. Example case-study scenarios, presented in order of
increasing level of complexity.
Problem 1. Tree fertilization
A field test to assess seedling growth response to alternative
fertilization regimes on a set of cutblock regeneration sites.
The study supports a classical experimental design
including replication and randomization, allowing strong
inferences to be made about causal relationships. The test
sites are located within a large forest tenure area that has
an approved long-term management plan in place and no
significant jurisdictional/regulatory considerations nor
stakeholder controversies.
Problem 2. Fisheries restoration
Assessing the choice of alternative restoration plans to meet
federally mandated minimums for resident populations of
salmonids downstream of a mid-sized hydroelectric dam
near to a major metropolitan area. Two species of salmon,
spring-run chinook and summer-run coho, have been
declared as endangered under the terms of the Endangered
Species Act. Developing a recovery plan will require a mix
of both standard and innovative restoration actions
designed to improve habitat quality and quantity. These
actions are expected to require flow restrictions on water
passing through the dam, reduced access to some upstream
forest activities (to reduce siltation of spawning grounds),
and limitations on further development of roads and
housing projects in the area.
Problem 3. Wildfire fuels management
Assessing the efficacy of forest fuels management
treatments to reduce wildfire risk in a wildland urban
interface community. Fuels management alternatives
include using mechanical fuels treatments, thinning, and
prescribed burns. Developing the plan will require the
direct involvement of provincial (or state) officials, local
government, two forest companies holding tenure in the
area, and community residents. Key issues to be considered
are wildfire risks to community residents and to properties,
smoke management and air quality, and the financial and
socio-economic feasibility of alternative treatments.
Problem 4. Climate change and land-use planning
Assessing the effect of climate change on land use
designations as part of a major regional land-use plan. The
plan must indicate the location and extent of future
protected areas (e.g., parks and biodiversity reserves)
which, in turn, has implications for competing and
complementary land uses (e.g., agriculture, forestry, urban
development) as well as recovery and restoration activities
in area rivers, lakes, and wetlands. Major climate change
uncertainties include the effects of temperature changes on
the health of fish populations, the effects of extended
growing seasons on agricultural crops and tree growth and
yield, increased threats from pests that might affect forest
health, biodiversity, the possible influx of invasive plant
species, and the influence of changing soil conditions on
species compositions and distributions.
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sufﬁciently strong that no further experimentation is
necessary. Decision-analysis techniques are helpful in
setting up this type of a priori analysis (i.e., by formally
estimating the value of additional information (VOI) to
be gained through additional trials) but they rarely have
been used as supporting justiﬁcation when proposing an
AM plan.
Spatial complexity.—AM plans that involve large
areas, such as Problem 2 (due to restrictions on other
land uses) and the climate-change land-use problem
(Problem 4), face numerous management hurdles due to
the spatial extent of the associated impacts. From the
standpoint of the ecological sciences, the types of broad-
scale questions often being addressed at this scale (e.g.,
the best location for a protected area as part of Problem
4) often preclude the use of replication and other
important experimental-design elements; there is simply
no comparable geographic area because of the extent of
the AM-related consequences. This is signiﬁcant, be-
cause learning requires a comparison to something, be it
a control plot or a differently managed river or forest or
landscape. While observational designs (Schwarz 1998)
and retrospective studies (Smith 1998) offer a good deal
of analytical support in such situations, these methods
represent a compromise away from a ‘‘pure’’ experi-
mental design.
A direct correlation also often exists between the
geographic scale of the problem and the number of
jurisdictions, policies, and stakeholders that must
formally be taken into consideration. Not surprisingly,
there are few examples of successful ‘‘true’’ experimental
designs at the scale of watersheds or large ecosystems.
What often happens, instead, is that AM initiatives are
initiated on subsets of the problem (e.g., individual
reaches or tributaries of a river) with few opportunities
for the transfer of this learning to other areas or back to
the overall management plan. Yet this lack of connec-
tion between subsets of a given AM plan need not be the
case. If thoughtful choices are made about where to
conduct assessments so that they focus on key uncer-
tainties and can be ‘‘scaled up’’ so as to be applicable to
larger areas, then AM initiatives can work well (for an
example, see Bunnell and Dunsworth [2004]).
External effects.—A further consideration is control-
ling for background trends, including both other
developments in the area that themselves create envi-
ronmental changes and cumulative effects that result
from other management initiatives taking place over the
duration of a trial. Designing experiments, based on
explicit hypotheses, that are sufﬁciently powerful to
unravel the causal webs of interaction between manage-
ment actions and ecosystem responses in the midst of
large-scale environmental changes—what statisticians
would call ‘‘nonstationarity’’ and others simply a
‘‘shock’’—is no trivial matter. The sheer analytical
complexity of designing AM experiments to cope with
the confounding of results with trends external to the
experimental treatment can be overwhelming. As a
result, AM applications (especially in more dynamic
management environments) are more likely to be
successful when the management problem is tightly
speciﬁed in terms of its temporal and spatial bounds.
From an AM-design perspective, anticipating the
impact of external effects can add signiﬁcantly to the
complexity of an experimental design. Yet if this
complexity is viewed as a blanket reason to forego
learning opportunities through AM, then a host of
potentially signiﬁcant applications—involving questions
such as those at the forefront of Problems 3 and 4—may
be neglected and the scientiﬁc uncertainty associated
with proposed strategies will largely be hidden from the
view of decision makers. When the management
environment is very active, and particularly if multiple
resource- management agencies are involved in the study
area, a better approach is to set up an AM design that
recognizes complexity and has sufﬁcient predictive
capability to allow for a choice among management
actions depending on the status and signiﬁcance of
anticipated external events. If this design capability is
not possible—because of ﬁnancial or temporal con-
straints, or due to a lack of predictive capability
regarding the nature or timing of signiﬁcant external
events—then serious consideration should be given to
restricting the scope of the trial so as to increase
conﬁdence in the anticipated ecosystem response.
Dimensions of ecological uncertainty
Dealing effectively with what ecological uncertainty
implies for the design of environmental management
plans is the core purpose of AM. Yet the term
‘‘uncertainty’’ covers a wide range of phenomena
relating to the outcomes of a plan, the assumptions
that underlie management interventions, the values
associated with the anticipated consequences, and a
variety of institutional responses. Resource managers
who want to apply AM must carefully assess these
various dimensions of uncertainty and the conﬁdence
which they and other participants (community residents,
resource users, First Nations, academic scientists) have
in the resulting assessments.
Structural uncertainty.—Structural uncertainty results
when important relationships between ecological vari-
ables have not been identiﬁed correctly or when their
functional form is not known with precision. Fervent
AM supporters optimistically claim the surprises that
may arise in such circumstances can provide some of the
best opportunities for learning.
Unfortunately, the very notion of clearly documenting
what we do not know as the basis for experimenting with
valued and, in many cases, fragile ecosystems can pose a
dilemma for any manager. It is hard to envision
participants engaged in a land-use planning exercise that
is addressing fundamental climate-change uncertainties
who would willingly accept any experimental approach
that could have ‘surprising’ adverse outcomes on an at-
risk species, other conservation objectives, or even timber
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supply. Implementation of AM is difﬁcult whenever
signiﬁcant surprise outcomes related to pre-identiﬁed
structural uncertainties (and subject to multi-stakeholder
examination) are possible. Before proceeding with an
AM plan, therefore, managers must have some conﬁ-
dence in the level of resilience (i.e., the adaptability to
change) that exists within both the ecological and social
systems to be managed. Low levels of resilience must be
considered carefully, regardless of AM’s potential to
reduce ecological uncertainty over time.
Parameter uncertainty.—A common point of conten-
tion in the design of AM plans is examination of the
statistical uncertainty inherent in a proposed AM
application. This dimension refers to the uncertainty
associated with parameter values that are not known
precisely but can be assessed and reported in terms of
the likelihood or chance of experiencing a range of
deﬁned outcomes.
A variety of methods exist for representing probabi-
listic variables and model inputs, typically involving
probability distributions (Morgan and Henrion 1990,
Cullen and Frey 1999). When the underlying (ecological
or causal) mechanisms are known, there can be a
theoretical basis for selecting a particular distributional
form; variables derived from multiplicative processes
often approach a lognormal distribution, purely random
processes often are represented by a Poisson distribu-
tion, and so forth. Yet even when such theoretical
models are applicable, real-world conditions often lead
to signiﬁcant deviations. In some cases (particularly if
data quality is high), parameter estimation techniques
can be used to identify an appropriate distribution. In
other cases (particularly if data quality is low or if there
is substantial controversy or disagreement among
experts), there is often no substitute for expert-judgment
elicitation techniques. In such cases, technical experts
might (for example) be asked to estimate the 90 percent
conﬁdence intervals for a calculated expected value, such
as the maximum seedling growth in ﬁve years (e.g.,
Problem 1) or the expected juvenile salmon biomass
(e.g., Problem 2).
AM seeks to apply the techniques of formal scientiﬁc
investigation so as to reduce parameter uncertainty
through the design of experimental trials or effective
monitoring regimes that will be capable of reﬁning or
redirecting implementation methods. In the case of
assessing alternative forest-fertilization regimes, the
opportunity to develop statistically powerful experimen-
tal trials is readily evident. Unfortunately, the ability to
successfully meet the strict requirements for randomiza-
tion, replication, and representation lessens with both
the number and scope of the uncertainties that must be
probed. Consider the case of the land-use plan (Problem
4): developing an experimental or monitoring design
capable of dissecting the interacting effects of changes
induced by climate change on forest growth rates,
natural disturbances, and species composition using end
points that include timber supply and biodiversity
conservation would be a monumental task. This
suggests that scientists must be realistic about the ability
of AM experiments to reduce uncertainty, rather than
simply develop a better understanding of it, and that
careful screening of uncertainties is required to distill
which sources of uncertainty are thought to matter the
most from the standpoint of stated management
objectives and feasible alternatives.
Stochastic uncertainty.—Stochasticity, or variation
due to pure chance and unrelated to systemic factors,
is a particular form of uncertainty that requires special
attention in the design of AM initiatives. The problem
from a design perspective is that inherent randomness,
associated with many aspects of nature, is irreducible in
principle. Stochastic uncertainty thus affects the design
of AM experiments to the extent that outcomes are
dependent on the frequency of, and control over, an
unpredictable yet important triggering event or condi-
tion. Consider the assessment of fuel-management
treatments in Problem 3. While it is possible in theory
to apply most of the tools for a powerful statistically
designed experiment, the ultimate outcome—under-
standing the efﬁcacy of treatments in reducing wildﬁre
impacts—is dependent on experiencing a wildﬁre itself.
However, a wildﬁre may occur partway through a multi-
year treatment program or 50 years afterwards or not at
all; it may be very intense or slow; and it may have a
wide range of different effects on the forest (e.g., it may
affect only tree crowns or burn surface debris and soils).
Such an uncooperative (from an AM standpoint)
natural event may ‘‘test’’ certain treatment areas and
not others.
Under these circumstances, then, the question be-
comes: To what extent will managers be able to attribute
identiﬁed outcomes (e.g., a low-intensity ﬁre within a
certain treatment area or the absence of a destructive ﬁre
altogether) to a speciﬁc AM plan? If managers have little
or no conﬁdence in their ability to provide a positive
response, then the added value of conducting experi-
mental trials (in contrast to passive AM or even simple
‘‘best-guess’’ management) may be minimal. Thus,
experimental AM may be an unreasonable concept
when the resolution of key sources of uncertainty relies
on low probability, randomly triggered, and highly
variable events. One response to stochastic uncertainty
could be to expand the duration of the AM treatment,
since randomness will tend to ‘‘settle out’’ over time and
thus make it easier to separate signal from noise.
However, such a strategy may conﬂict with other
objectives such as cost or external effects and would
also need to be balanced with a temporal scale tolerated
by managers and key stakeholders.
Conﬁdence in assessments.—A ﬁnal important dimen-
sion of ecological uncertainty is the degree of conﬁdence
in assessments held by scientists and other participants.
If the level of uncertainty is high (for any of the reasons
discussed above), then the use of AM may be
inappropriate because the results of planned experi-
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ments will not be interpretable. Moreover, if very little is
known, then it may be impossible to develop testable
hypotheses or to separate the effects of experimental
manipulations from external inﬂuences without the
beneﬁt of additional data (e.g., from baseline ﬁeld
studies, modeling, etc.).
However, it is unclear in many cases if the lack of
conﬁdence in assessments is brought on by real
uncertainty surrounding the system or if it is the product
of limited precision across the sciences. One response to
this dilemma is to import information from another
ecologically comparable area (at least with respect to
key dimensions of the problem under consideration)
about which substantially more is known. Another
response is to make use of expert-judgment techniques,
based on the methods of decision analysis, which can
help to clarify assessments of conﬁdence in two ways:
they can help to make assessments of conﬁdence explicit,
for example by moving from verbal to quantitative
statements of uncertainty and thus overcoming linguistic
imprecision, and they can help by making explicit any
differences between experts. Formal techniques for
ascertaining the level of conﬁdence in assessments are
well deﬁned (Morgan and Henrion 1990, Keeney and
vonWinterfeldt 1991) and analytical approaches to
explicitly express the degree of conﬁdence in judgments
continue to improve. For example, methods for docu-
menting a ‘‘traceable account’’—i.e., a formal record of
the lines of evidence used and the means of reconciling
any differences among them—have become more
common (Moss and Schneider 2000). More recently,
van der Sluijs et al. (2005) and others have developed
formal approaches to documenting the pedigree of
information sources as a semi-quantitative rating of
reliability. These advances are encouraging and should
be promoted further when considering the implementa-
tion of AM, as should the general use of formal expert-
judgment elicitations (Gregory and Failing 2002).
Nonetheless, numerous writers on the topic of AM
have pointed out the inherent difﬁculties associated with
bridging the gap between scientists, managers, and
stakeholders on the topics of conﬁdence and credibility.
Walters (1997), for example, has chastised scientists who
promote research self-interests, political decision makers
who blame inaction on the need to ﬁrst resolve
uncertainties, and stakeholders who focus on a single
uncertain ecological value. A skilled participant can
nearly always spin issues of uncertainty management in
creative and self-serving ways. In our fuels- management
case study, for example, individuals opposed to pre-
scribed burns due to misperceptions about their
ecological risks can emphasize a lack of conﬁdence in
estimates of smoke impacts on the elderly or aesthetic
effects on tourism to the extent that they feel these
arguments will help to win over a larger—and similarly
opposed—audience. While this type of strategizing can
occur at almost any scale of AM application, its
likelihood mounts as the uncertainties become more
profound, the consequences more severe, and self-
interests increasingly threatened.
Evaluating costs, beneﬁts, and risks
Many AM approaches fail or are abandoned because
proponents do not fully understand, or have not taken
the time to identify, the targets that they seek to achieve.
Accurate predictions of future costs, beneﬁts, and risks
that will result from an AM plan hinge upon the careful
speciﬁcation of its often wide-ranging consequences. To
this end, the basic framework for evaluating the costs,
beneﬁts, and risks of adaptive-management options
should be no different from that required for any other
resource-management initiative: ﬁrst clearly deﬁne
management objectives (which can broadly be charac-
terized as controlling costs, maximizing beneﬁts, and
reducing risks) and then use these multiple objectives to
evaluate a plausible range of alternatives, while taking
into account key uncertainties regarding both conse-
quences and likely institutional responses. Added to this
basic framework is the requirement to state a range of
possible hypotheses about the response of the natural
system, and to evaluate design options based on the
probability of each hypothesis being correct.
Specifying beneﬁts and costs.—Identifying the beneﬁts
of AM plans begins with all the standard problems
(How will changes in habitat quality affect future
numbers of a key species? How will changes in land
prices over the next 30 years affect population densities
near to a protected area?) but adds to these the problems
of addressing multiple trials that will achieve their
results with varying probabilities of success. Simply
collecting the information required to complete each of
these evaluations can be particularly difﬁcult, and time
consuming, when considering alternative AM proposals.
With active AM plans, for example, the plausible range
of values for the outcomes of interest need to be
estimated for each of several hypotheses about the
prevailing states of nature (Gregory et al. 2006). Small
wonder that decision makers often need (and do not
always receive) help in deciding between a single non-
experimental plan (i.e., passive AM, with monitoring for
the key sources of uncertainty and ﬂexibility in future
management options) and an experimental program of
comparative trials (i.e., active AM, involving several
explicit experimental treatments).
Technical specialists who work over many months or
years on an experimental regime often feel that their
design is close to ideal in the sense that all possible
inﬂuencing factors have been taken into account. In our
experience (as outside analysts, called in to evaluate such
plans), we have yet to see the perfect strategy. This point
is not intended to confuse good decision making, which
is within the control of managers, with the success of
outcomes, which—because of factors such as variability
and stochastic uncertainty—will remain, to some degree,
outside their control. Instead, the conclusion is that the
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predictive capacity of study hypotheses is generally less
than anticipated—often substantially so.
Within the context of these general difﬁculties in
anticipating the beneﬁts and costs of AM plans, there
are two issues of particular concern. The ﬁrst is the need
to weigh the impact of potential opportunity costs. As
discussed above, long time lines can make it difﬁcult for
managers to take other actions in the same geographic
area or affecting the same resources. To the extent that
other beneﬁcial actions (e.g., one-time-only habitat
enhancements with a short turn-around time) are
postponed in order to preserve the clarity of experimen-
tal results, this represents an opportunity cost (associ-
ated with foregone options) that might not be possible to
deﬁne at the inception of the AM initiative. The second
issue arises when deﬁnitive actions may need to be taken
sooner than expected due to institutional or political
reasons, which could (in the extreme) result in the
midcourse termination of an AM plan. Either way,
unanticipated changes in the experimental design will
have the unfortunate effect of decreasing the relevance
of a priori evaluations and will make it more difﬁcult, if
not impossible, to interpret with sufﬁcient accuracy the
results of trials or ongoing monitoring.
Magnitude of effects.—It is perhaps obvious, but often
(it seems) overlooked, that the results of an AM trial
need to be measurable, as distinct from base-line
conditions and background noise. From a practical
standpoint, this may inﬂuence the design of an AM
initiative and the development of guiding hypotheses.
For example, in Problem 2 it is generally much easier to
achieve clearly measurable beneﬁts in the form of
increases in the quantity of habitat than it is to achieve
measurable increases in habitat quality. The ease with
which one attribute (such as quantity) can be measured
should not preclude a focus on other relatively less
tractable improvements (such as habitat quality) as part
of an AM plan. In-depth discussion of the measurability
of impacts during AM planning emphasizes the need for
creative techniques to develop effective measures of
anticipated changes in objectives. Decision-analysis
techniques again provide a good source of ideas,
including an emphasis on constructed indices that can
facilitate the creation of problem-speciﬁc measures for
key ecological and community variables (Keeney and
Gregory 2005).
The results of an AM manipulation also need to be
sufﬁciently large for them to matter. If the magnitude of
anticipated results is too small, then the expected
beneﬁts simply will not count: the change will fall below
some threshold measure of the least-signiﬁcant-impact
magnitude. Stated differently, if a change across the
range of probabilistic improvements in a key evaluation
criterion is not expected to lead to a management
change, then the proposed treatments may be scientif-
ically interesting but practically insigniﬁcant. This point
has three elements. First, measures of beneﬁts need to
have some appeal to a broad audience; consider, for
Problem 2, the difﬁculty that non-technical audiences
might have interpreting the signiﬁcance of changes in a
‘‘smolt to spawner’’ ratio. Second, the consequence (i.e.,
the before–after or with–without change in a measure)
must be sufﬁciently large that it is coded as being
signiﬁcant, that is, as making a difference to managers
and other key stakeholders. Third, explicit hypotheses
need to be developed so that the signiﬁcance of
responses can be assessed in advance (rather than on
an ad hoc basis) and so that links to management
actions can be made efﬁciently.
Multiple objectives.—Adaptive management (and en-
vironmental management in general) would be far
simpler if there were only one objective of concern.
For example, ﬁsheries-recovery actions could be taken
to maximize population abundance, or silvicultural
activities could seek solely to maximize yield in a timber
supply area. In actuality, management activities must
take into account multiple objectives: ﬁsheries-recovery
actions need to address other ecological (e.g., species
diversity) and economic (e.g., commercial-harvest inter-
ests) concerns, as do silviculture treatments (e.g.,
minimize use of harmful herbicides, provide high-quality
wood, and so forth). Rarely is there a single, dominant
planning objective to serve as the focus of experimen-
tation, such as in our simplest case of conducting
fertilization trials (Problem 1). More often there are
multiple objectives that need to be addressed, and
tracked over time, using both formal and informal
assessment methodologies.
When assessing the relative reduction of wildﬁre
hazard among prescribed-burn and mechanical-thinning
treatment approaches, as in the case of Problem 3, the
core experimental hypotheses may be conceived quite
narrowly. However, the evaluation of design options
and the implementation of the experiment itself must
explicitly address other objectives including the risk
posed to community assets, economic cost, employment
implications, and smoke-related health and aesthetic
concerns. These other objectives also must be addressed
when selecting among management options (Ohlson et
al., in press). In short, when considering the appropri-
ateness of AM it is not enough that a given plan will
further scientiﬁc knowledge. Instead, the results need to
matter in the sense of making a substantial difference in
the context of the multiple objectives important to
decision makers, who otherwise have little reason to
allocate scarce public funds to an AM (or any other)
approach.
Broadening the scope of AM requires that proponents
design a plan so that it clearly addresses trade-offs
among objectives, because these are likely to be
important to stakeholders for whom ecological interests
are of lower priority than related economic, cultural, or
social concerns. For example, the biodiversity beneﬁts of
a fuels-management AM plan may make a difference to
ecologists but not to homeowners; to capture home-
owner support, links may need to be drawn from a
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healthy forest to reduced ﬁre danger and, in turn, to
higher economic values for properties. Scientists who
work hard to develop an AM plan may view such
additions as lessening the purity of their planned
experiment, but we are not sympathetic: making ties to
other objectives not only helps to develop support but
also explicitly recognizes the multiplicity of values that
are at play.
Perceived risks of failure.—Typically, an AM ap-
proach will suggest either multiple interventions at
different sites (so that results can later be compared)
or at different times (so that a choice can later be made
favoring the preferred trial). The need to compare
multiple trials means that some will be more successful
than others, which can lead to the characterization of
less successful trials as failures, at least in a relative
sense. In such cases the perspective of those who
organize the experiment can be quite different from
that of those who, for example, live or work in or have
concerns about the area where a less-successful trial was
run; agency scientists may code as successful the same
AM experiment that others code as a failure. Although
obvious prescriptions follow, such as communicating the
rationale for the AM strategy clearly with all potentially
affected parties, there is little evidence that proactive
public-outreach efforts as part of AM will dampen
critiques of the method.
Yet AM initiatives are fundamentally about learning,
and as choices are made along the continuum from
passive to active AM—presumably in hopes of increas-
ing learning— there is also a greater likelihood that what
is tried will fail. For most technically trained scientists,
‘‘failure’’ is a relative term in the sense that it is viewed
against the alternative management options. For exam-
ple, if the risk of extinction is high and action is urgently
needed to save a species, then experimentation guided by
the principles of AM may well make sense despite the
uncertainty over outcomes. In this case, the perceived
risk of failure is likely to be lower with the AM initiative
than without. Other stakeholders, however, may not pay
sufﬁcient attention to the default (do nothing, or do
what seems best) option and, if population numbers
decline, this so-called ‘‘failure’’ might well be blamed on
the adoption of an AM approach.
Nevertheless, fear of failure should not necessarily lead
to the adoption of monitoring over passive AM, or to
passive over active AM. Instead, managers need to work
closely with stakeholders to deﬁne their concerns and
assess their risk tolerance, then develop mechanisms such
as stopping rules that, when built into the design of AM
plans, clearly identify thresholds and have the power to
halt an experiment should these values be threatened.
Stakeholder and institutional support
Lee (1993) clearly articulates that institutional sup-
port is required to successfully undertake AM. At a
minimum, there needs to be an awareness among
decision makers that reductions in uncertainty are a
necessary focus of management actions and require
speciﬁc policy guidance. This support needs to be
relatively stable: continuity in support is critical so that
resources for an adaptive management plan are not
withdrawn part-way through an experimental or mon-
itoring plan. There also needs to be a clear connection
between the activities of biological scientists and the
goals and objectives of key decision makers. In our
experience the successful implementation of AM also
requires several other factors: leadership to guide
stakeholders in understanding key beneﬁts of the AM
plan, the ability to be ﬂexible in responding to a range of
management options, avoidance of concerns that might
prevent AM trials, and a high degree of competence
among technical staff.
Leadership.—For discussions about AM trials to be
productive, there needs to be a recognition among those
who design, and those who make decisions about, the
proposed experiments and monitoring plans that a
speciﬁc focus on reducing ecological uncertainty will
lead to improved environmental-management strategies.
For implementation of an AM plan to be successful,
there also needs to be strong leadership that will guide
the discussions among stakeholders and address their
concerns about a management strategy that is explicitly
experimental in nature. This is manifested in an
obligation to demonstrate the value of using an adaptive
approach rather than some other method (Gregory et al.
2006). Lee (1993) and others (e.g., Westley 2002) have
emphasized that this is challenging, largely because it
requires framing the ‘‘policy-oriented’’ learning that is
possible through AM in terms that recognize the world
of real politics as well as the cognitive and behavioral
limitations that individuals operate under when making
choices about complex and novel options. Of course,
one perspective on the experimental nature of AM is to
emphasize that all management actions, including the
option of doing nothing, also are experimental in that
they involve the implementation of actions with
uncertain consequences. In this sense, AM plans are
simply more explicit about the attendant uncertainty.
At a process level, the need for leadership becomes
even more pronounced when the group responsible for
making a decision body is made up of a large, diverse
group of stakeholders. Whereas agreement might easily
be reached among agency scientists and other technically
trained participants, the expansion of participants to
include community members, other resource users, and
First Nations/Native Americans can increase the poten-
tial for conﬂict—and the apparent need for compromise,
resulting in a watered-down version of an AM
experiment. Stakeholders are likely to feel uneasy
whenever key ecological information is unknown or
contested, particularly to the extent they view themselves
as stewards of the public trust and, thus, responsible
should a decision made today have unforeseen adverse
consequences in the future (McDaniels and Gregory
2004, Froschauer and Arvai 2006). A focus on adaptive
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learning provides a way to move forward in the face of
limited information and unfamiliar trade-offs because
decisions made today will be revisited in the future, once
more has become known. Thus, an AM strategy can
change one-time decisions into iterative, sequential
decisions with opportunities for later reﬁnement and
adjustment, thereby easing concerns about later being
held responsible for a consequence viewed as undesir-
able (Failing et al. 2004).
Flexibility in decision making.—Proponents of AM
need to think about whether there is sufﬁcient ﬂexibility
within the broader regulatory framework to respond to
the new information that AM monitoring or experi-
mentation may provide. Consider getting 10 years into a
fuels-management program and discovering that pre-
scribed burning is offering signiﬁcantly better perfor-
mance from a risk-reduction standpoint than expected.
Would management agencies allow for a ramping up of
this activity?
Of course, the question of ﬂexibility in response is a
two-sided undertaking. Institutions do need to have a
willingness to be ﬂexible and to act in response to new
information, assuming that trade-offs across objectives
are addressed; in the previous example, for instance,
improved performance from a risk-reduction standpoint
would need to be weighed against the predicted
outcomes associated with increased burning as they
relate to other objectives such as maintaining suitable
air-quality levels or meeting certain ecological targets.
Likewise, scientists and others who aid in the design of
AM plans also must, a priori, develop clear protocols for
which adjustments are needed, including the deﬁnition
of clear triggers (what thresholds or results should
initiate a change?) and management responses (in the
event a threshold is reached, which is likely to be the
appropriate management change?).
Avoidance of taboo trade-offs.—Managers contem-
plating adoption of an AM approach must also ask
whether the proposed experiments might create unac-
ceptable or highly controversial risks, often character-
ized in the literature as taboo trade-offs (Fiske and
Tetlock 1996) or protected values (Baron and Spranca
1997). Such concerns are marked by characteristics such
as quantity insensitivity (it does not matter how much of
something is affected—even a little is too much).
Oftentimes, taboo trade-offs are accompanied by
judgmental paralysis; the moral obligation to ‘‘do the
right thing’’ cannot be reconciled with the need to make
trade-offs across objectives that seem equally important
(e.g., the desire to simultaneously protect both human
and environmental health). Previous authors, for
example, have highlighted the conundrum posed when
the potential outcomes of management experimentation
may impact sensitive species at the expense of other
important social objectives (e.g., Walters 1997). Of
course, the existence of a sensitive or endangered species
often is the reason for consideration of an AM initiative,
which poses an interesting intellectual and legal quan-
dary: AM may be most difﬁcult to implement in
precisely those circumstances where it is most needed.
Consider, for example, the case of the interface fuels-
management problem (Problem 3) where ‘‘experiment-
ing’’ suggests that some communities or areas might
knowingly be exposed to higher wildﬁre risks than
others. In this case, once the risk aversion of participants
(including elected ofﬁcials) comes into play, the frequent
result is a weaker experimental design wherein proposed
interventions may not be signiﬁcant enough to trigger a
meaningful ecological response. Simply put, once taboo
trade-offs arise as part of the evaluation of consequenc-
es, the feasibility of AM becomes severely limited unless
a creative way is found to address these concerns.
Helpful methods do exist (Gregory 2002), but (as noted
below) the question is whether managers are knowl-
edgeable and comfortable in using them.
Institutional capacity.—Any environmental manage-
ment plan is only as good as the capacity of the
implementing institution to deliver on its promises. In
this regard, there are some special problems with respect
to the adoption of an AM plan. The most obvious has to
do with the training of managers. As conveyed by a
cursory glance through the applied AM literature (e.g.,
Walters and Green 1997, Failing et al. 2004), the
required level of statistical and analytical sophistication
is quite high. Earlier discussions noted the need for use
of VOI (value of added infrastructure) studies (see
Duration, above) and methods to explicitly address
difﬁcult trade-offs; other common techniques include
Monte Carlo simulations and expert-judgement elicita-
tions. A common problem is that these skills, needed to
design statistically valid AM treatments, seldom exist in-
house and often require additional contract resources.
In those cases where individuals with the required
expertise are on staff, the claims on their time are likely
to be severe. For example, AM plans may require
annual (and in many cases, more frequent) assessments
of ongoing trials followed by decisions concerning
whether sufﬁcient new information has been generated
that something other than current practices should
continue. Nor is it a straightforward matter to hire
consultants or academics to lend a hand; in contrast to
many of the other skills held by ecologists or biologists
or planners or policy analysts, relatively few individuals
have been trained in the statistics or methods needed to
successfully design and evaluate AM plans.
DISCUSSION
Not all environmental-management problems require
signiﬁcant learning in order to reduce ecological
uncertainty; instead, many management actions present
themselves as obvious and common-sense choices, so
that the value of additional reductions in uncertainty is
negligible. However, even if an environmental-manage-
ment problem justiﬁes attention to the objective of
reducing uncertainty and if the resources are available to
attempt some form of active AM, we still suggest that
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proponents consider the criteria outlined in the preced-
ing discussion.
Fig. 1 presents an overview of the application of the
criteria to our hypothetical planning problems using a
simple three-tier rating system that distinguishes among
aspects of environmental-management problems in
terms of (a) those that will not prove difﬁcult for AM
applications, (b) those that will present acceptable
challenges, and (c) those that will present signiﬁcant
challenges, particularly to the application of active,
experimental, AM approaches.
With Problem 1, assessing tree-fertilization alterna-
tives, there should be no signiﬁcant impediments to
proceeding with a comprehensive, active, AM approach.
In particular, the opportunity to develop a statistically
powerful suite of experimental trials is readily evident.
The only challenges that would need to be addressed
would be ensuring that adequate staff time and skills
FIG. 1. Application of the proposed adaptive-management (AM) criteria to four hypothetical but realistic case-study example
problems.
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were in place to support the initiative, and that the
results of the trials could be shown to have an effect of
sufﬁcient magnitude so as to justify the investment.
The assessment becomes more complicated in Prob-
lem 2, the ESA-induced river restoration case. Here
signiﬁcant, yet not insurmountable, challenges to an
active, experimental, AM approach exist in terms of (a)
designing statistically powerful experiments capable of
discerning external effects and effectively considering
issues of duration (i.e., using titration designs), (b)
articulating all the costs, beneﬁts, and risks of alterna-
tive experimental and non-experimental management
plans, and again (c) ensuring that sufﬁcient staff
capacity and institutional ﬂexibility exist. The most
signiﬁcant hurdles, however, relate to the potential
existence of taboo trade-offs in the form of experiment-
ing with endangered species and the related (perceived)
risks associated with failure. Even a passive AM
approach might be signiﬁcantly challenged by the
requirement to get resource managers to explicitly state
and agree upon the hypotheses related to the structural
uncertainties that underlie the river-restoration plan.
Nonetheless, Problem 2 seems like a good candidate
for implementation of a passive AM approach for at
least the most signiﬁcant management challenge, ﬂow
regulation through the hydroelectric dam. Managers
could develop a best-guess operating scheme based on
stated hypotheses regarding the potential for recovery of
endangered salmon. They could also develop, in
advance, the set of triggers and actions that would be
implemented based on intensive monitoring results.
Problem 2 might also provide an opportunity to
implement a limited-scope active AM approach on an
important sub-problem. For example, assume that
suitable sub-watersheds exist to enable a paired exper-
imental study of alternative forest or housing-develop-
ment impacts on hydrology and water quality. In time, it
is conceivable that well-planned active AM on such sub-
problems could be scaled up to inﬂuence broader forest
management and development regulations throughout
the region.
A very different set of challenges face the pursuit of an
active AM approach for Problem 3, the wildﬁre fuels-
management case. As described above (see Criteria for
assessing. . . : Dimensions of ecological uncertainty:
Stochastic uncertainty, above), the key triggering event
necessary to ultimately learn about the efﬁcacy of
alternative management schemes, in this case a wildﬁre,
is a low-probability random phenomenon. We believe
that it is unrealistic to both design an active AM
approach as an overall guiding framework, and to
expect stakeholders to agree to it up front, when
signiﬁcant challenges exist in the form of such stochastic
uncertainties. Further, in this problem there is simply no
getting around the need to address multiple objectives as
part of the planning process. For example, smoke-
management considerations must be taken into account,
as well as the potential risk to community assets from
escape ﬁres, if one wants to implement a program of
prescribed ﬁres near a community. These are very real
and tangible objectives that must be integrated into the
evaluation of experimental designs, for all of the
multiple-objective problems noted above (e.g., weighing
long-term reductions in wildﬁre probability and habitat
improvement against short-term smoke-management
objectives and signiﬁcant front-end ﬁnancial costs).
Problem 3 does, however, represent an important-
enough problem that a commitment to the use of a
passive AM approach might be warranted. As discussed,
managers could develop a single-option management
approach that might involve the combined use of
mechanical thinning and prescribed burning across the
landscape in a manner justiﬁed by stated hypotheses.
They could similarly develop, in advance, a set of
triggers and actions that may, admittedly, have to wait
for the results of a wildﬁre, or be confounded if one were
to occur prematurely. Nonetheless, the up-front effort at
stating hypotheses should provide for some degree of
learning over time and help to target monitoring so as to
lead to the greatest reductions in uncertainty.
For Problem 4, land-use planning under climate
change, the temporal and spatial scale issues alone are
enough to eliminate a comprehensive active AM
approach. It is simply inconceivable to envision a
large-scale and long-term experimental design aimed at
probing the preferred location of protected areas and
areas managed for forestry and agriculture. Signiﬁcant
challenges would need to be overcome in order to
implement even a passive AM approach that could form
the basis of a long-term, ﬂexible management plan. In
past examples where AM has been attempted as a
guiding management philosophy at such a large scale,
such as the Columbia Basin or the Florida Everglades,
there was a distinct lack of explicitly stated scientiﬁc
hypotheses, monitoring triggers, and management im-
plications, and no clear indication of whether the policy
framework would be sufﬁciently ﬂexible and responsive
to adapt to learning over time. Experience has shown
that this type of management context is a prescription
for costly implementation failures.
Conclusion
Despite its obvious attractions—Who would not want
to advocate a plan that promises reductions in
uncertainty through learning?—AM is not an approach
to be adopted without forethought and careful analysis.
Some of the barriers and ecological complexities
discussed in this paper pose signiﬁcant challenges that
must be addressed if proponents desire to defensibly
select and implement an AM approach. Others, such as
the inﬂuence of external effects or the existence of low-
probability, stochastic triggering events, unfortunately
can simply be unsolvable in some cases. The trick is to
incorporate into experimental designs those signiﬁcant
factors that can be anticipated and to recognize when
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conditions are, and are not, conducive to the choice of
AM an as approach to environmental management.
The four categories of criteria discussed in this paper
are intended to provide an explicit basis for making the
decision about whether to choose an AM approach.
Modiﬁcation in speciﬁc circumstances will of course be
necessary; these criteria, at best, will provide a starting
point for the development of more focused site- or
program-speciﬁc criteria. Our assertion, as decision
scientists with an interest in the design of sound
environmental plans and policies, is that having explicit
criteria at the beginning of deliberations about environ-
mental-management options (which may include AM) is
better than the typical current practice, which involves
coming up with ad hoc criteria to justify a suite of
actions partway through the development of a manage-
ment plan.
This emphasis on proactive criteria is also intended to
help distinguish true AM initiatives from imposters.
Adaptive management, as currently invoked, is far too
often used simply as a euphemism for environmental-
management plans that admit to the need for learning in
the face of ecological uncertainty but lack the other
components—attention to spatial and temporal scale,
structured hypotheses that acknowledge different types
of uncertainty, a design that addresses evaluation needs,
and attention to institutional and stakeholder support—
that are necessary for the design of an effective and
defensible AM plan.
Finally, this discussion is intended to help lay the
groundwork for a more informed consideration of AM
by both expert and nonexpert stakeholders. Increasing-
ly, discussions about potential adaptive-management
options involve a wide range of participants, including
many with little or no training in ecology or biology. In
our opinion, this is entirely appropriate: the decision to
undertake an AM strategy is appropriately placed
within a broader policy context due to the important
economic and social as well as biological implications.
In this context, the value of AM as a guiding philosophy
should not provide an excuse for its proponents to
neglect the tough work required to come up with a
strong and fully speciﬁed management plan. The failure
to do so neglects both the promise of adaptive
management and the social contract within which it is
undertaken.
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